The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in the case of Guo v Kinder and Others has dismissed an appeal by the appellant in a second appeal, the outcome of which raises points for review and note. We hope this article is of assistance in particular for Litigants In Person (LiPs).
The Facts
The legal issues in this case primarily revolve around the procedural aspects of filing a claim and the substantive allegations of professional negligence. In this case, Ms. Guo contends that the respondents were negligent in their legal duties, specifically in relation to the assignment of a lease which involved a validation order that she believes could have been challenged. The appellant, Ms Guo issued the claim form in the High Court and it was subsequently transferred to the County Court at Preston. The respondents applied for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to strike out the claim on the basis that it was statute-barred. A Deputy District Judge gave summary judgment in the respondents' favour on the issue of limitation, holding that the appellant's claims, in tort and contract, were statute-barred (outside of the limitation period to bring a claim). Where a claim is brought for breach of contract or professional negligence the time to bring a claim ends on the 6th year anniversary.
The Legal Detail
All potential causes of action arose prior to 21 August 2015 and the CPR PD 7A, para 5.1 (now 6.1), was of no assistance because the claim form 'as issued' was dated 25 August 2021.
Procedurally, the case highlights issues concerning the filing of claims within the court system. Ms. Guo experienced difficulties with the electronic filing (E-filing) of her claim, which led to uncertainty about whether her claim had been successfully filed. This situation underscores the challenges litigants may face with E-filing systems and the importance of clear communication and confirmation from court offices regarding the status of filed claims.
The ruling
The judge held that the appellant's claim form was issued in the High Court on 25 August 2021 and that earlier versions which the appellant had alleged she had filed on 4 or 5 August were not 'as issued'.
The court dismissed the appeal holding that it was not possible to conclude that the claim form 'as issued' on 25 August 2021 had been received by the court office at an earlier date. On the facts, there was no basis for the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction.Â
Inherent jurisdiction is a common law power that enables the High Court to make decisions in situations where there is no existing statute law to address a particular issue. It acts as a safety net, filling gaps left by statute law when necessary to protect the interests of society.
Takeaways
This case touches upon the court's jurisdiction to determine the date of issue of a claim form. In this case, the Court of Appeal discussed whether the inherent jurisdiction to determine the date of issue survived the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). The court concluded that if this jurisdiction did survive, it would only apply in circumstances where the litigant had completed all necessary actions but the claim form was not issued due to errors or deficiencies in the court office.
These procedural and substantive issues were central to understanding the complexities and legal intricacies involved in this case.
The outcome of this case the case will likely have a significant impact on litigants in person, particularly in how the courts manage cases involving them and the expectations placed upon these litigants regarding compliance with procedural rules and court orders.
The general principle upheld by the courts is that litigants in person are subject to the same procedural rules as represented parties. This is evident from cases such as Barton v Wright Hassall and Reynard v Fox, where it was established that being a litigant in person does not excuse non-compliance with court rules or justify a lower standard of compliance. This principle reinforces the expectation that litigants in person must adhere to the same standards as their represented counterparts.
However, the courts also recognise the challenges faced by litigants in person and may offer some degree of assistance or leniency in certain situations. For instance, the court may adopt procedures at hearings to assist unrepresented parties, as outlined in CPR 3.1A, which requires the court to consider the fact that a party is unrepresented when making case management decisions. This could include more active assistance in clarifying cases or a more lenient approach in certain procedural aspects, though not to the extent of compromising fairness to the opposing party or the integrity of the judicial process. LiP's should not therefore rely on or expect that the courts will give any favour to them.
Where a litigant in person is deemed vulnerable, as defined in CPR PD 1A, the court is required to ensure that such parties can participate fully in proceedings and that the quality of evidence is not diminished due to their vulnerability.
On a final point to note, while the courts maintain that litigants in person must comply with the same rules as represented litigants, there is an acknowledgment of the unique challenges they face, and some accommodations may be made to ensure fairness and justice in the proceedings. The outcome of this case will likely reflect this balance between adherence to procedural norms and the equitable treatment of unrepresented litigants.
PW-LA offer bespoke ad hoc, unbundling services to LiP's at any stage of their case.
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